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 Abstract  
Many owners of companion animals with cancer are overwhelmed by having to choose the 
“right course of action.” In this work, principles that apply to ethical treatment decision-making 
for animal patients with cancer are discussed, with the aim of reducing the burden on owners 
who are forced to act as surrogates for their animals. Four principles frequently used for ethical 
decision-making in human medicine will be considered for their potential applicability in 
veterinary medicine. As a result of these considerations, preliminary guidelines are presented, 
along which a decision-making discussion can be held. The deliberate integration of the non-
maleficence and beneficence principles into the purely empirical facts of what is medically 
possible helps to maintain a moral perspective in specialized veterinary medicine. At the same 
time, such guidelines may contribute to individual decision-making in a way that animal 
patients neither have to endure unnecessarily severe side effects, nor that they euthanized 
prematurely.  
 Introduction 
Surveys indicate that companion animals are seen by 88-98% of their owners as members of the 
family.1 Having such deep relationships with animals is an increasingly accepted social 
phenomenon. The increase in such relationships is partly due to changes in our social fabric 
caused by increasing urbanization and self-selected or involuntary social isolation. For many 
owners, these animals thus play an important social role, and the idea of a “companion” animal 
reflects the social component of the human-animal relationship.2  
Whether as a cause or a consequence of this relationship, the treatment options and 
standards for companion animals have continuously grown over the past decades or even 
century, and many veterinary clinics offer high levels of diagnostic and therapeutic modalities. 
Imaging methods, such as computed tomography and magnetic resonance imaging, as well as 
such treatments as prosthetic joints, immunotherapy, dialysis, and cancer therapies for animals 
are now readily accessible in many cases. In addition to the diagnostic and therapeutic options, 
veterinary palliative care and hospice options are emerging in certain countries with the aim of 
“addressing patient’s unique emotional and social needs as well as physical needs (…)” upon 
terminal illness.3-5  However, regarding treatment of animal compared to human patients, 
several aspects remain different, as owners must mostly bear the costs themselves and only a 
fraction of owners have pet health insurance. In addition, the option to euthanize animal patients 
can sometimes be considered as an alternative to treatment of disease. 
These differences can lead to many types of conflicts of interest in the practice of highly 
specialized veterinary medicine. In addition to the veterinarian’s obligation to treat animal 
patients, some veterinarians are also committed to further research and development, especially 
in the field of veterinary oncology. Clinical trials conducted on animals (animal patients) follow 
similar ethical rules and can be included in the considerations made herein. Hence, the 
veterinarian’s role as a healer takes a high priority in the profession’s code of ethics. According 
to conventional wisdom, the choice of treatment should be in the animal’s “best interest,” but 
 this concept lacks a clear definition.6, 7 Rollin notes that the animal’s owner may not necessarily 
represent the animal’s best interest: “(...) many owners will, for their own sakes, do anything 
possible to keep the animal alive at all costs, ignoring or downplaying the animal’s suffering, 
despite their professed (and heartfelt) love for these animals.”7 Hence, it has become part of the 
professional responsibility of the veterinarian to support the owner in both medical and ethical 
decision-making issues regarding choosing the optimal treatment strategy for their companion 
animal.3, 6-9  
The aim of this work was to discuss principles that apply to making ethical treatment 
decisions for animal patients with cancer from a veterinary point of view. Beauchamp and 
Childress’ four principles frequently used for ethical decision-making in human medicine 
(autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice) will be considered for their potential 
applicability in veterinary medicine.10 Two of these principles were found to be excellent in 
helping to weigh the available options and ensure that generally applicable norms and the needs 
of both the animal and its owner are considered and weighed accordingly. 
 
Duties of the veterinarian: ethical principles  
General ethical obligations require veterinarians not only to undertake recognized 
measures to prevent and cure disease but also to relieve pain, injury, suffering, and anxiety, but 
also to share responsibility for the animal’s welfare. Offered treatments should always be 
compatible with a “good quality of life” for the particular species. Euthanasia should be 
performed according to the profession’s rules after a precise diagnosis and prognosis by 
respecting the animal and the owner, and extending pain and suffering or ending an animal’s 
life prematurely solely at the owner’s request should be refused.1, 11-13  
Whether a being itself (such as a companion animal) is given moral consideration when 
a decision is made, is a question of moral status. Assigning such a moral status is usually 
 dependent on certain morally relevant traits constituting an interest, e.g., the ability to feel pain. 
Because animals can be injured by actions, e.g., violation of their interest in being free of pain, a 
moral consideration for such beings makes sense. 
Different views about how we should treat animals can be inferred from various 
theories.10, 14-16 For example, the biological criteria in terms of the animal’s species are used less 
often; instead, a judgment is made on the existence of “human characteristics” such as cognitive 
abilities, such as ideation, memory, understanding, and thinking, agreeing that many animals 
also have such capabilities to some extent.14 Cognitive traits, such as recognizing one’s body, 
following plans for foraging and nest building, playing, and having a social life, are certainly 
found in our companion animals.17 Another theory assigns moral status to moral agents.16 This 
means that the individual can make a moral judgment about right and wrong and that the 
individual has motives that can be judged morally. Immanuel Kant focused in this regard on 
free will, autonomy, and dignity, which he had similarly proposed as conditions for moral 
status.18 While these conditions might certainly be considered sufficient conditions for moral 
status, insisting on their necessity is counterintuitive because vulnerable parties, such as 
children, people with disabilities or dementia, and indeed even animals, require special 
protection in regard to moral consideration.19 A third theory based on sentience refers to traits 
that include emotional and affective feedback, and advocates of this view consider sentience 
sufficient for moral status.14, 19 This position actually calls for the moral equality of all sentient 
creatures, but there could be a gradation where the interests of animals differ (e.g., depending on 
their level of evolutionary development).  
None of these theories seem to be fully satisfying on their own, and they also fail to 
give clear indications of the extent of such moral considerations in practical application. 
However, various theories make plausible arguments for the existence of a moral status in 
animals and thus provide sufficient grounds to deal with animals morally by taking their 
interests into account. While these interests are also species-specific in nature, in all cases, they 
 include the following basic components: (i) cognitive faculty as part of an active consciousness 
and functioning sensing organs; (ii) the ability to give emotional and affective feedback in 
certain social interactions; (iii) enough mobility to allow eating, nest building, and maintenance; 
(iv) freedom from pain; and (v) freedom from fear.19, 20  
 
The ethical conflict: positions in the ethical debate 
Although companion animals are often called “family” members, views on their value 
vary widely. Despite the assumption used here that animals have a moral status, there can be 
conflicts between the interests of the animal (which, of course, are largely unknown and are 
made by proxy) and those of the owner in regard to making medical treatment decisions. 
Consequently, one must decide to what extent the (largely unknown) animal’s interests should 
be considered and whether they only matter if linked to human interests (e.g., those of the 
owner, the neighbors, or society as a whole).  
In an anthropocentric view, humans place themselves at the center of moral significance 
with the top priority in the ethical debate. However, the protection of the animal in this position 
still plays an important role because it includes standards that humankind finds useful. In 
principle, the utilization of nature, including non-human animals, is considered ethically 
legitimate, as long as the resources are handled responsibly and are fairly distributed.18 From the 
anthropocentric worldview, animals have no intrinsic value, and their right to exist is derived 
from their usefulness to humankind. The basic needs principle of the philosopher Martha 
Nussbaum morally legitimizes the use of non-human nature as a resource to satisfy the basic 
needs of humankind.21 Because “man is the measure of all things (...)”(sic)1, everything serves 
its purpose and is thus a means to a human end. This results in what is only an indirect 
obligation to non-human beings merely as part of the human environment. Kant observed it as a 
                                                
1 Protagoras (Greek philosopher, probably around 490-411 B.C., writings only survived available); the 
full quotation is: “Of all things the measure is Man, of the things that are, that they are, and of the 
things that are not, that they are not.” 
 duty not owed directly to the animal, but as a part of the human duty to oneself. Humans should 
eschew the violent and cruel treatment of the “irrational part of creation” (i.e., animals), since 
this would lead to the brutalization of the human race and blunt compassion for the rest of 
humankind. While Kant did not reject the killing of animals, he stated that they should be 
“executed without torment.” Otherwise, we would be breaking our obligations to ourselves.18 In 
an anthropocentric view, animals therefore only have minimally relevant moral interests and are 
important only insofar as they serve human purposes. These purpose may include 
companionship or service (e.g., guide dogs), and from an anthropocentric perspective, a humane 
disposal (e.g., euthanasia) would be a morally acceptable solution once they are no longer 
useful.22  
However, nowadays environmental ethics answering how humans ought to behave 
towards nature, is shaped by animal rights philosophers such as Reagan and Singer. The stated 
pathocentric view suggests that the pain and suffering of the animal and its interest in not 
suffering should take a very high priority.19, 20 The animal is not to be seen as a resource that 
must be handled from a moral perspective (i.e., out of consideration of the owner’s or another 
human’s interest), but instead, the animal’s own ability to suffer and sentience requires moral 
consideration.19 The biological relationship and commonality between humans and animals 
come here to the fore, and animals are therefore seen as morally relevant sentient beings from a 
utilitarian point of view. According to the principle of the equal consideration of sentient 
beings, comparable interests (i.e., interests in avoiding pain, distress or suffering) should be 
treated equally.19 This second pathocentric position constitutes animal ethics based on 
deontological rights, a position which ascribes an animal’s right to life and its inherent value. 
Tom Regan describes those beings (adult humans and normal mammals) as “subjects of a life” 
with traits and abilities, such as perception, desires, memory, self-confidence, ideas of the 
future, and interests. These subjects have a right to welfare centered on their autonomy and 
inherent value, and they are not to be treated as if this value is merely the result of their 
 usefulness.20 Thus, Regan says that both individual human beings and animals have an 
elementary right to regulatory protection, even if they cannot themselves comprehend the moral 
issues or apply it autonomously. In his view, the understanding of a legal concept is not 
necessary for it to be applicable. Thus, this places great value on the ability to experience life on 
a conscious level, and as much respect should be given to an animal’s interest in being fed, 
living to an age appropriate for its species, and social interactions, among others, as to those of 
another human being.19, 20 
Medical ethicists Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress described four ethical 
principles in the first edition of their standard textbook “Principles of Biomedical Ethics” in 
1977. Their goal was to give medical personnel an ethical orientation in their dealings with 
patients.10 Physicians have a moral obligation to do no harm (non-maleficence), to provide 
treatment when necessary (beneficence), to respect the patient’s right to self-determination 
(autonomy), and to treat patients fairly and equitably (justice). These four principles are 
basically hierarchically equivalent, with the first two modeled on utilitarian and virtue ethics 
and the latter two on deontological doctrine. These principles are thus based on both moral 
theories and common sense. While the moral theories weigh decisions and actions either in 
terms of their consequences (utilitarianism), the obligation to do something regardless of the 
consequences (deontology), or the quality of those characteristics that enable a good or 
successful life (virtue ethics), common sense is based on general experience(s) considered 
universally valid.10 The application of the principles thus allows a pluralistic perspective in 
concrete decisions while still requiring clear weighing.23 Often, veterinarians make intuitive use 
of these principles to determine moral obligations, but intuition is known to follow few rules, 
and a deliberate consideration of such principles can facilitate more-objective decision-making.  
In weighing the arguments considering the welfare of the animal and its owner, 
financial and/or scientific arguments often play a strong role. While such non-moral aspects 
should initially be set aside in order to free ourselves from such material constraints when trying 
 to make a moral decision, they often come back into play when it comes time to implement the 
moral solution. In addition, the owner’s financial situation may constitute an anthropocentric 
argument when considering the (costs and) benefits of a certain option, thus becoming a part of 
the moral argument that must be considered in certain situations. 
 
Moral evaluation of different options 
To determine the practical, case-specific applicability of Beauchamp and Childress’ four 
principles in veterinary oncology, one should first identify all of the available treatment options. 
Next, one should consider whether all of the principles can or should be applied in veterinary 
oncology in a way that is analogous to the situation in human medicine. 
The principle of non-maleficence says that one should do no harm. Any intervention, 
such as chemotherapy, surgery, or radiation therapy, may already represent a conflict. An 
amputation of a limb, for example, inherently does cause clear harm to the patient. However, the 
harm should not be disproportionate to the benefits of any given treatment. Under the “doctrine 
of double effect,” this harm can be relativized, since the treatment justifies inflicting one 
setback in exchange for another, higher-priority goal (pain relief and longer survival) and is 
therefore not morally wrong.24 The doctrine of double effect allows treatment with morally bad 
consequences (in this case, damage), if such consequences are only unintended side effects. 
Hence, as long as a) the chosen action is itself good or morally neutral; b) the person doing it 
does not actively seek the ill effect (but instead must let it happen); c) the beneficial effect of the 
action is as immediate as the ill effect; and d) the benefit is sufficiently desirable, then the action 
is not morally wrong. In bone tumor, for example, a surgical intervention such as amputation of 
a limb can have the sole focus on removing the source of pain, induced by the tumor. The 
resulting damage (i.e. the loss of the limb) however, is relevant for the animal for other reasons 
such as mobility, even if with this palliative intervention the aim of pain relief was achieved.  
 The principle of beneficence encourages the caregiver to act in a way that benefits the 
patient in a maximum way. This includes finding a balance between the benefits of treatment 
against the risks and costs. Treatment options shall mostly focus on relieving symptoms and 
prolonging, maintaining or restoring a good quality life. These aims need to be weighed against 
both the anatomical/cosmetic changes and any side effects of the chosen treatment, which can 
be quantified/estimated in terms of frequency, intensity, and duration. Although euthanasia ends 
the pain, this option also ends the animal’s life and can therefore not be considered as an act 
supporting its well-being.  
The respect for autonomy cannot be applied to animal patients because it is impossible 
to obtain its informed consent for diagnostic and therapeutic measures.25 Any consideration of 
the animal’s wishes, goals, and values are estimates at best, even if they can be anticipated to 
some extent, and treatments can account for individual animals’ temperaments and 
preferences.26 Consequently, these decisions are made by surrogates, as is also the case for 
incompetent human patients.25  However, while in incompetent human patients the individual 
values may have been expressed earlier, and are shaped to some extent by socio-cultural values, 
the situation in animal patients is different. The animals “true values” are not known and can 
not be priviledged over those of the decision maker. A best-interest standard is based on what 
are ultimately unknown, if relevant autonomous preferences. The surrogate must therefore 
weigh the best available option with respect to risks, burden, and costs. This standard is 
designed to promote the best interests of the patient and is therefore a criterion for the quality of 
life.8, 25 One must ensure that the animal patient’s fundamental interests (as described above) are 
preserved even after the intervention and that the animal will have a good quality of life.  
The principle of justice actually calls for a fair distribution of healthcare.24 The original 
principle of justice can thus be applied only with great difficulty when making care decisions 
for an (individual) animal patient. However, it could possibly be used for equal consideration 
across species.  
 The interaction of the four principles as described above can give the veterinarian 
ethical orientation when handling animal patients (and their owners). However, two of the 
principles seem particularly useful for the veterinarian to consider when weighing the well-
being of the animal with that of the owner: non-maleficence and beneficence. Both can be 
applied to both the owners and animals. The principles of autonomy and justice in this context 
are not applicable or not meaningful as they cannot consider both sides or are already included 
in an overlapping form in the principle of beneficence. Surprisingly, the principle of autonomy 
does offer some additional assistance in the process, namely, in the disambiguation of the best-
interest standard used when autonomous preferences are not or cannot be known. Under the 
best-interest standard, the surrogate must determine the most likely overall benefit from the 
available options. This is done by weighing the interests of the patient and balancing the 
(treatment) options against the inherent risks, burdens, and costs. This primarily fosters the 
principle of beneficence, and by maximizing the effect (the “best” interest), this standard 
promotes the quality of life.14 This standard can only be applied if there are different treatment 
options that are not equally capable of promoting the patient’s well-being, or where some 
options are associated with major side effects. The best-interest standard should help the 
surrogate to promote the patient’s well-being from an objective perspective and to weigh the 
potential benefits with the possible side effects. However, the principle of best-interest standard 
decision-making applies to humans, and human cognitive mechanisms are believed to be quite 
accurate in interpreting the mental states of the same species. However, the so-called “mind-
reading” skills of humans are insufficient already in humans who, for some reason, for example, 
lack rationality (due to illness, accident or old age), and are probably highly inaccurate in 
interpreting the mental status and desires of non-human animals.26 
In summary, at least two of the four principles of Beauchamp and Childress are very 
suitable for use in making decisions in veterinary oncology as part of a real-world pluralism. 
 Although they are limited to certain areas, they do have the advantage of being less abstract than 
the moral theories, compatible with the moral theories and widely accepted in society.  
 
Specific application of the principles  
1) Making a decision: the empirical facts, well-being and quality of life 
The definition of a “treatment of choice” or “gold-standard treatment” in oncology must 
generally be based on empirical data. Treatment success is described in a measurable, 
empirically indisputable way, such as the time to disease progression or the survival time after 
diagnosis or treatment. Such parameters describe the quantitative benefits of treatment but often 
neglect the qualitative. While these numbers are indeed tangible for a pet owner, they are un-
interpretable for making a moral decision. Bernard Rollin describes this development, 
observable in many areas of oncology, as follows: “While chemotherapy or radiation did indeed 
prolong life in many instances, medicine failed to ask at what cost. (...) Qualitative 
considerations (...) became invisible to scientific medicine in the face of the assumption that 
more life was always better, a victory against the disease.”1 The relevant facts of the individual 
malignancy and the expected consequences of a treatment must be provided alongside 
numerical facts to pet owners. This information is essential to the owners being fully and 
correctly informed so that they may be in a position to make an appropriate decision.  
Quality of life aspects of animals with cancer have been addressed to some extent in the 
current literature. Quantification of pain caused by naturally occurring tumors in companion 
animals has been investigated for bone cancer, and made use of the extensive experience of pain 
measurement scores in humans.27, 28 For example, a canine brief pain inventory (CBPI) was 
established that reliably measures owners’ assessment of severity and impact of pain, with 
feedback on treatment response or progression of disease.27 But also nonpain conditions were 
assessed by designing tools to prospectively measure health-related quality-of-life (HRQoL), 
also a concept derived from human medicine.29, 30 Such questionnaires usually provide a good 
 concordance in quality-of-life perception between owners and veterinarians, and can often be 
used both, in clinical practice and in clinical trials.29, 31, 32  
In the case of a medical action or choosing a treatment, it may occur that the 
achievement of one benefit may require the sacrifice of another or that an evil can only be 
avoided when another is accepted. These pros and cons are weighed against each other in a 
trade-off. These goods may include basic goods, such as life, health, physical, and 
psychological integrity, as well as consumer goods, such as food and shelter. When faced with a 
trade-off, a choice is typically inevitable, and any benefit usually also brings a certain amount of 
harm in tow, which needs to be rationally quantified as part of the process. Rules of thumb that 
exist beyond moral theories opting for the lesser evil (defined as having relatively short-term, 
one-time, or reversible harm) over the greater evil (defined as having long-term, recurring, or 
irreversible harm) are particularly useful for evaluating the use of animals in experiments – 
which may bring about a greater good - but are not particularly useful in clinical practice. 
However, it is useful to use the solution model involving trade-offs in defined basic 
needs, as described by Ursula Wolf. She describes that there is no need for a common definition 
of well-being or of a good life. This is because in her opinion, some basic negative conditions 
make it impossible to define having a good life, as they constitute forms of “elementary 
suffering.” She thus distinguishes two major groups of conditions: on the one hand are 
preconditions or prerequisites, and on the other hand are those conditions that are indispensable 
aspects.33 These preconditions include the right to life and adequate material conditions, such as 
food and accommodation, things that our companion animals should necessarily be given. 
However, there is a right to physical and psychological integrity that makes it possible for the 
animal to behave in species-specific ways. This second group of conditions includes being able 
to undertake meaningful activities with a certain level of autonomy (the animal as the agent) and 
the ability to enjoy pleasant feelings, positive experiences, and pleasure (the passive experiences 
 of the animal). The third group includes satisfying social relationships (see also Fig. 1). She thus 
indicates that animals have the same moral rights to well-being as do humans.34  
These preconditions and indispensable aspects of the “good life” coincide widely with 
the animal’s interests as discussed earlier. The animal’s welfare thus depends on these criteria, 
which can be considered sufficient for a kind of basic quality of life. These basic conditions 
should, however, be considered as the minimal threshold, which should be impaired only for the 
shortest period possible (e.g., within a double effect of a treatment). If the information already 
available to the veterinarian about the possible treatment options suggests that these conditions 
cannot be met in the medium to long term, another treatment option or euthanasia should be 
considered. This opinion can be justified by the limited cognition of the animal: “Paramount in 
importance is the extreme unlikelihood that they can understand the concepts of life and death 
in themselves, rather than the pains and pleasure associated with life or death. To the animal 
mind, in a real sense there is quality of life (i.e., whether its experiential content is pleasant or 
unpleasant in all modes capable of – bored or occupied, fearful or not fearful, lonely or enjoying 
companionship, painful or not hungry or not, thirsty or not). There is no reason to believe that 
an animal can grasp the notion of extended life, let alone choose to trade current suffering for 
it.”1 In addition to these basic conditions, several authors recommend further reflection on what 
would constitute a good quality of life for the animal and thus motivate the pet owner to make a 
decision. These considerations should be recorded in the form of a list and include what gives 
the animal individual satisfaction or dissatisfaction and describe how this can be judged.1, 8, 13  
2. Requirement of costs/benefits 
When considering the trade-offs of costs/benefits, the above mentioned solution model 
based on Aquinas’ theory of actions with double effect is useful because it allows the harm 
resulting from the diagnosis and treatment to be considered under the principle of beneficence 
and thus weighed as part of the considerations. With any medical treatment, certain collateral 
damage such as side effects of treatment or a temporary worsening of the condition (for 
 example, the healing period after surgery) can precede a significant improvement in the 
patient’s condition. In the medical context, it may be more useful to replace the term “intended” 
with a “tolerated side effect”.35  
When weighing various treatments, Beauchamp and Childress describe the cost-
effectiveness and the cost-benefit analyses, two tools that use monetary quantification to 
minimize the risk of intuitive and subjective assessments of a treatment and instead place it in 
an objective light.24 Since the financial aspect is initially defined outside moral consideration 
when choosing a treatment for a cancer patient, it is appropriate to speak of a risk-benefit 
analysis. This describes the relationship between the likelihood and the degree of an expected 
benefit and the probability and magnitude of an expected loss.24 However, the owner’s financial 
situation is a legitimate constraint and anthropocentric argument to consider when weighing the 
animal’s and the owner’s well-being (e.g., when the resulting bills might affect the owner’s 
well-being). 
3. Requirement of a “long life”/possibility of euthanasia 
Euthanasia is derived from Greek and refers to a “good death.” In veterinary medicine, 
euthanasia has largely positive associations, such as being humane, relieving pain, or being 
cathartic.36 Nevertheless, the veterinary act of euthanasia is the deliberate ending of an animal’s 
life. This makes euthanasia a double-edged sword: while being a powerful tool for ending pain 
and suffering, it also ends the life of the animal. An evaluation of whether an animal’s life 
should be ended, is recommended to be based on the overall welfare that can be expected.37 
There are the required basic conditions that constitute a minimal threshold for a “good life,” as 
described above, but there is also the question of “the right time.” After all, it is basically in the 
interests of the animal to live. In addition, the interest in being free of pain, anxiety and other 
conditions that may be attributable to suffering must be considered. Thus, the time is right when 
it is determined that these conditions can no longer be guaranteed for the medium or long term 
and that euthanasia would be the preferred option. At that point, it might lead to a serious 
 conflict between the animal’s welfare and the well-being of the owner, which may cause the 
veterinarian considerable moral stress.1, 12, 13 Requests for euthanasia for the sake of the owner’s 
convenience and rejections of euthanasia for an animal that is clearly suffering and whose 
quality of life no longer meets the basic condition, according to Bernard Rollin “(...) may well 
be the most important ethical task facing the conscientious veterinarian.”1 
Practical application of the guidelines 
The considerations made for making moral judgments and the requirements for weighing the 
benefit and well-being of the animal and owner as described above can be summarized in an 
initial set of guidelines (Fig. 1): 
 (A) Based on the non-maleficence and beneficence principles, the expected “good” for both the 
animal and owner are listed. The possible side effects are judged using the double effect 
doctrine (B). If the side effects of a specific treatment can be tolerated, then the basic conditions 
postulated for the well-being of the animal patient (C) are used to provide a measure of 
objectivity that sets a minimum threshold to protect the animal. This takes into account the 
pathocentric perspective that most veterinarians and pet owners follow. The basic conditions 
can be extended through (D) other criteria that define an individual good quality of life, thus 
maximizing the interests analogous to the concept of the “best-interest standard.” If the 
treatment meets these criteria, then a decision for the treatment that delivers the greatest good 
defined in (A) or the best risk-benefit balance can be made. At this point, other aspects that go 
beyond the moral aspects (e.g., financial) can be considered, and the form of treatment that best 
matches the review of the moral criteria can be selected. 
 
Additional considerations for the future 
Many pet owners of animals with cancer are overwhelmed by having to choose the “right course 
of action.” Experience has shown that this also frequently overwhelms veterinarians who do not 
 specialize in the field of oncology. In such cases, euthanasia is often prematurely chosen with 
the argument that this is “probably best for the animal.” The discussion of the animal’s moral 
status also allows their interests to be defined. Beauchamp and Childress’ principles based 
partly on moral theories but also on common sense could be shown to aid in ethical decision-
making. As a result, the concrete weighing of interests can occur. Fig. 1 presents a preliminary 
proposal for integrating these principles and weighing the pros and cons in the form of a trade-
off. The doctrine of double effect asks whether the side effects of a treatment can be tolerated 
(within the principle of non-maleficence) and thus sufficiently justify the desired effect. If this 
is fulfilled in the scheme, a minimum threshold considering the basic needs of the animal and 
additional individual criteria can be defined for the protection of the animal. These basic needs 
are combined from different sources and constitute a “target” corresponding to the ethical 
principles of the veterinarian as well as the requirements for protecting the animal’s dignity 
imposed by animal protection legislation and regulations. These basic needs set a threshold that 
must be met for the animal patient and in the case that an animal owner argues from a highly 
anthropocentric perspective. This view thus primarily considers the pathocentric perspective.  
The path to choosing the “right therapy” is often complex. The deliberate integration of non-
maleficence and beneficence into the purely empirical facts of what is medically possible allows 
specialized veterinary medicine to maintain a moral perspective. The proposed decision-making 
guidelines can contribute to mitigating this problem. They can thus help to reduce the burden on 
the pet owner who is forced to act as a surrogate for the animal. At the same time, the guidelines 
guidelines ensure that animal patients do not have to endure unnecessarily severe side effects 
even when treating difficult diseases, and that they are not euthanized prematurely.  
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